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ABSTRACT
India’s foreign policy decisions and actions are oft en questioned and debated in the context of great power polarities. 
Although the context for discussions is relevant, India’s experiences in recent history, especially during the Cold War have 
been underestimated and overlooked. Th is article argues that challenges during the Cold War and the foundations of Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM) should be considered fundamental when explaining India’s foreign policy decisions and the idea 
of strategic autonomy that drives its politics on international arena. Even more, considering the NAM principles and building 
upon post-Cold War decisions, India’s idea of strategic autonomy refl ects Nehruvian idealistic and moralistic principles 
combined with PM Modi’s realistic foreign policy principles. Th ese principles and the idea of strategic autonomy will be 
explained through three Indian foreign policy choices. Firstly, India’s focus on the region exhibits the desire to build up 
a strong region to minimise the risks from possible great power rivalries. Secondly, relations with emerging powers like 
BRICS and IBSA demonstrate the ambition of building up a just world order. Th irdly, India’s ambition to reform UN and its 
economy exhibits its ambitions of raising into a great power status where power and responsibilities are interrelated. Finally, 
India’s idea of strategic autonomy will be explained, where power, responsibilities and moralistic world view are all part of it.
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“We will promote a democratic and rules-based international order, in which all nations, small and 
large, thrive as equal and sovereign…”1
Exploring India’s role in the launch of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) during the Cold War and its relations with participant 
countries today is pivotal to understanding India’s idea of strategic autonomy in the 21st century. India’s economic growth has 
not only re-opened the debate about country’s rise in world arena and raised the question about the form of power it will gain2 
but has also brought up the need to understand its oft en incomprehensible foreign policy choices. Country’s negotiations 
with US on the matters of nuclear capabilities, confrontational relations with Pakistan and China have characterized India as 
a challenging negotiating partner and a country with complicated foreign policy. For EU, the FTA negotiations grab most of 
1 Narendra Modi, ‘Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue (June 01, 2018), Government of India, Ministry of 
External Aff airs (Shangri La, 2018), available online at: http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+Ministers
+Keynote+Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+June+01+2018> (accessed 11.06.2018).
2 Eswaran Sridharan, ‘Where Is India Headed? Possible Future Directions in Indian Foreign Policy’, International Aff airs, (2017), 93(1), 
pp. 51–68.
7the attention to develop the much-criticized strategic partnership into deeper relationship and to overcome the obstacles for 
more successful economic relations.
As the confrontation between US and Soviet Union has ended, there will be examined to what extent do the continuity of 
NAM principles exist in the relationships between India and region, BRICS, IBSA and behind domestic and international 
reforms. Th e paper argues that despite the absence of confrontation, the aspects of NAM principles are still present in India’s 
current foreign policy to achieve long-desired foreign policy independence, today as strategic autonomy. Even more, country’s 
post- Cold War choices exhibit a model of ‘lessons learned’ foreign policy.
Th e request for independent foreign policy has been one of the major goals since country’s independence in 1947 and is 
closely related to the ambition of restoring the great power status.3 As will be shown in this article, in order to understand and 
evaluate India’s foreign policy decisions, country’s experiences during Cold War, dissatisfaction with current world order, 
India’s position and role in current world order, and concerns about future changes combined with the ambition of becoming 
a great power should be taken into account. As will be discussed later in the article, these aspects will constitute what India 
considers as strategic autonomy.
Th e literature has mainly focused on India’s foreign policy and its aspirations towards great power status4 also briefl y touching 
upon the bargaining strategies5. Although the NAM was of utmost importance for Th ird World and was at the centre of India’s 
Cold War foreign policy,6 relatively little attention has been paid to the interrelatedness of the principles of the movement 
and India’s foreign policy choices aft er the end of the Cold War. Th us, this article aims to fi ll this gap by studying India’s 
current foreign policy activities and principles explained through the prism of NAM values in past and in present. Building 
upon Cold War time NAM principles and that time India’s foreign policy decisions, the article will demonstrate how India’s 
current foreign policy has been shaped. In order to explain current aims and principles through Cold War time choices, the 
article will use India’s policy in the region and participation in BRICS and IBSA to show how relations with ‘like-minded’7 
3 Th e origins of the great power status lie in Ashoka’s Mauryan Empire in 322 – 185 BC.
4 Baldev Raj Nayar, ‘India in 2005: India Rising, but Uphill Road Ahead’, Asian Survey, (2006), 46 (1), pp. 95–106; Amrita Narlikar, 
‘Peculiar Chauvinism or Strategic Calculation? Explaining the Negotiating Strategy of a Rising India’, International Aff airs, (2006), 
82 (1), pp. 59–76; Peter R. Lavoy, ‘India in 2006: A New Emphasis on Engagement’, Asian Survey, (2007), 47 (1), pp. 113–24; Rahul 
Sagar, ‘State of Mind: What Kind of Power Will India Become?’, International Aff airs, (2009), 85 (4), pp. 801–16; Surjit Mansingh, 
‘Assessing Reorientation of India’s Foreign Policy in a Globalized World’, International Studies, (2010), 47 (2–4), pp. 143–61; Walter 
C. III Ladwig, ‘India and Military Power Projection: Will the Land of Gandhi Become a Conventional Great Power?’, Asian Survey, 
(2010), 50 (6), pp. 1162–83; Subrata K. Mitra, ‘Nuclear, Engaged, and Non-Aligned: Contradiction and Coherence in India’s Foreign 
Policy’, India Quarterly: A Journal of International Aff airs, (2009), 65 (1), pp. 15–35; Rohan Mukherjee and David M. Malone, ‘Indian 
Foreign Policy and Contemporary Security Challenges’, International Aff airs, (2011), 87 (1), pp. 87–104.
5 Narlikar, ‘Peculiar Chauvinism or Strategic Calculation? Explaining the Negotiating Strategy of a Rising India’; Amrita Narlikar, 
‘India Rising: Responsible to Whom?’, International Aff airs, (2013), 89 (3), pp. 595–614; Amrita Narlikar and Aruna Narlikar, 
Bargaining with a Rising India: Lessons from the Mahabharata, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
6 Cecil V. Jr Crabb, ‘Th e Testing of Non-Alignment’, Th e Western Political Quarterly, (1964), 17 (3), pp. 517–42; Irene Brown, ‘Studies 
on Non-Alignment’, Th e Journal of Modern African Studies, (1966), 4 (4), pp. 517–27; A.P. Rana, ‘Th e Intellectual Dimensions of 
India’s Nonalignment’, Th e Journal of Asian Studies, (1969), 28(2), pp. 299–312; Michael Brecher, ‘Non-Alignment Under Stress : Th e 
West and the India-China Border War’, Pacifi c Aff airs, (1980), 52 (4), pp. 612–30; Satish Kumar, ‘Nonalignment: International Goals 
and National Interests’, Asian Survey, (1983), 23 (4), pp. 445–62; Cedric Grant, ‘Equity in International Relations: A Th ird World 
Perspective’, International Aff airs (Royal Institute of International Aff airs 1944-), (1995), 71 (3), pp. 567–87.
7 Like-minded’ countries or nations is a term India uses in its annual foreign policy reports to refer to states sharing the same 
standpoints and values on matters of UN reform. Government of India Ministry of External Aff airs, Annual Report 2006-2007, New 
Delhi, (2007), p. ii, available online at: <http://www.mea.gov.in/annual-reports.htm?57/Annual_Reports> (accessed 10.06.2018) ; 
Government of India Ministry of External Aff airs, Annual Report 2008-2009, New Delhi, (2009), p. 110, available online at: <http://
www.mea.gov.in/annual-reports.htm?57/Annual_Reports> (accessed 10.06.2018); Government of India Ministry of External Aff airs, 
Annual Report 2009-2010, New Delhi, (2010), p. 111, available online at: <http://www.mea.gov.in/annual-reports.htm?57/Annual_
Reports> (accessed 12.06.2018); Ministry of External Aff airs, Annual Report 2010-2011, New Delhi, (2011), p. 106, available online 
at: <http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/45_Annual-Report-2010-2011.pdf> (accessed 12.06.2018); Government of 
India Ministry of External Aff airs, Annual Report 2011-2012, New Delhi,( 2012), p. xv, available online at: 
8countries help India to work towards adjusting the international system to its expectations, where its strategic autonomy 
will be feasible. In addition, the incentives behind domestic economic reforms and the ambition of adjusting the UN will 
be explained. Finally, based on the explanation of India’s foreign policy since Cold War, author will reveal the meaning and 
importance of India’s idea of strategic autonomy. Th is article attempts to off er a new perspective to understanding India’s idea 
of strategic autonomy by examining country’s behaviour through NAM principles and challenges.
1. History: NAM principles and India’s foreign policy during Cold War
Th e widespread discussion and understanding of NAM has mainly focused on neutrality, ignoring foreign policy 
independence as an important and integral detail of the movement8. More precisely, it was the reluctance to choose sides in 
great powers’ power struggles that initiated the NAM states to declare to be non-aligned, oft en confused with neutralism. 
New de iure independent states aimed also for de facto independence in terms of their political voice, where states’ actions 
and choice refl ected their own preferences, not of a particular bloc9. Consequently, it was the common concern of developing 
countries to maintain their foreign policy independence, oppose colonialism and neo-colonialism and western domination10. 
According to Brown11 Algerian leader Ben Bella has declared that the movement was not aligned even with non-alignment. 
Th e NAM was thus a developing countries’ response to the fi ghting blocs, for “the common defence of their interest” to be 
non-aligned from either bloc12. Th e diff erence of NAM and neutrality thus stood in the state of international actors in the 
time of confrontation. Neutrality rules out any kind of support for participants in a confl ict, in other words, actors refuse to 
take part in any kind of activities in case of confl ict. NAM was thus similar to neutrality in a sense of not taking sides, but 
with the diff erence that if their decisions and actions coincide with one of the fi ghting blocs, it is their own preference, their 
own worldview, not supporting the bloc who has similar standings.
Th e principle of ‘acting and making its own choices’ also refl ected India’s goal to remain independent in foreign policy 
choices, although posing dilemmas and challenges between national interests on international arena and poverty alleviation 
at state level. Namely, the economic situation with the aim to raise population’s living standards challenged country’s defence 
capacity and vice versa13. Preserving state’s security thus required alternative measures. Th e solution for India was a skilful 
<http://www.mea.gov.in/annual-reports.htm?57/Annual_Reports> (accessed 12.06.2018); Government of India Ministry of External 
Aff airs, Annual Report 2012-2013, New Delhi, (2013), p. x, available online at: <http://www.mea.gov.in/annual-reports.htm?57/
Annual_Reports> (accessed 12.06.2018). Prior to the call for UN reforms by UN Secretary General Kofi  Annan in 2005, the term 
was used by India when explaining cooperation in issues such as peace-building, terrorism, extremism and human rights, etc. 
Government of India Ministry of External Aff airs, Annual Report 2000-2001, New Delhi, (2001), p. ii, p. 89, p. 102, available online 
at: <http://www.mea.gov.in/annual-reports.htm?57/Annual_Reports> (accessed 12.06.2018); Government of India Ministry of 
External Aff airs, Annual Report 2004-2005, New Delhi, (2005), p. 113, available online at: <http://www.mea.gov.in/annual-reports.
htm?57/Annual_Reports>(accessed 12.06.2018). Th us, the term is used when expressing shared values or standpoints on diff erent 
issues.
8 Brecher; Crabb; Werner Levi, ‘Indian Neutralism Reconsidered’, Pacifi c Aff airs, (1964), 37 (2), pp. 137–47; Francis Low-Beer, ‘Th e 
Concept of Neutralism’, Th e American Political Science Review, (1964), 58 (2), pp. 383–91.
9 Brown, 1966, p. 517
10 Government of India Ministry of External Aff airs, ‘History and Evolution of Non-Aligned Movement’, (2012b), available online at: 
<http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?20349/History+and+Evolution+of+NonAligned+Movement> (accessed 22.06.2018).
11 Brown, 1966, p. 517
12 Ministry of External Aff airs, (2012b), ch. Evolution
13 A Appadorai, ‘India’s Foreign Policy’, International Aff airs (Royal Institute of International Aff airs 1944-), (1949), 25 (1), p. 40; Jerome 
B Cohen, ‘India’s Foreign Economic Policies’, World Politics, (1955), 7 (4), pp. 546–71; Taya Zinkin, ‘Indian Foreign Policy: An 
Interpretation of Attitudes’, World Politics, (1955), 7 (2), p. 202; Micahel Edwardes, ‘Illusion and Reality in India’s Foreign Policy’, 
International Aff airs (Royal Institute of International Aff airs 1944-), (1965), 41 (1), p. 43.
9foreign policy, known as non-alignment, which in the context of USA and Soviet Union confrontation was set as a corner 
stone for Cold War time foreign policy14.
Th at time new strategy obtained large-scale support amongst domestic public but raised criticism on the international level. 
International arena considered NAM as a movement based on neutrality, which was largely a reason for questioning whether 
it was a mean to maintain India’s security and independence by avoiding alliances (while having USA and Soviet Union’s 
support for confl icts with China) or something else15. Th e new foreign policy strategy was soon tested, when over the nine 
years India was aff ected by four substantial occurrences: Sino-Indian border confl ict in 1962, Chinese 1964 nuclear test and 
Indo-Pakistani war in 1965 and 1971. As a result of these events and domestic reluctance against the conventional military 
strengthening, India again encountered discussions about the alternatives serving the goal of both national security and 
foreign policy independence. Respectively, the idea of nuclear deterrence was born. Th e new strategy was seen as enabling 
India to maintain independence in foreign policy decisions and keeping its membership in NAM16.
Although the preferred choice contributed to keeping NAM principles, it faced economic and political obstacles. Wars with 
China and Pakistan had led India to economically diffi  cult situation and brought along food crisis in mid-1960s, which 
made country dependent on US food. India’s position was further complicated due to agreements with Soviet Union about 
military equipment. Th is placed India again in a situation where on one hand the country had to remain consistent on the 
principles of NAM while on the other hand to act in a context where the meaning of the chosen strategy was still understood 
as neutrality, thus missing the reality of its choices. Even more, the relations with two opposing powers were politically 
complicated by US and Soviet Union endeavours to ban nuclear tests for countries that had not conducted the tests by 196717. 
To leave the possibility open for future nuclear capability developments, India decided not to sign the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. Th e tests were conducted in 1974, as a response to US decision to send its aircraft  carriers to the Bay of Bengal in 
1971 supporting West Pakistani forces in Bangladesh War. India referred to the test as a “peaceful nuclear explosive” while 
demonstrating its foreign policy independence foremost from US, but also from the Soviet Union18. In 1987 India decided to 
start developing nuclear weapons as a response to Pakistan’s nuclear weapon capability development supported by China19. 
Th e 1998 BJP government-lead nuclear tests gave Indian foreign policy makers an impetus to declare “we have set the stage 
to reclaim our rightful inheritance as a great power”20.
Despite the fact that the Cold War type confrontation between US and Soviet Union has ended and therefore NAM is not 
as apparent on international arena as it was during the Cold War, one must keep in mind India’s challenges during that time 
and country’s role as one of the founding members of the movement. Th e NAM was not only a foreign policy tool but also 
refl ected India’s foreign policy principles of solidarity and independence that have remained as parts of its current policy. 
Moreover, as the centres of trade and competition for resources amongst developed countries have moved to Asia and Africa 
respectively, but the Cold War time power distribution in international institutions remains, NAM principles are at least as 
relevant as they were in the past21. Rising economies and powers expect their political voices to be heard equally to their 
economic weight.
14 Appadorai; Zinkin.
15 Edwardes, p. 55.
16 Edwardes, p. 57.
17 Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V Paul, India in the World Order: Searching Major-Power Status, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
(2003), p. 164, p. 174.
18 Nayar and Paul, pp. 175–81.
19 Nayar and Paul, p. 199.
20 Madhup Mohta, ‘An Enguiry into India’s International Identity: Th e next Great Power?’, in Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and 
Opportunities, ed. by Atish Sinha and Madhup Mohta, New Delhi: Academic Foundation; Foreign Service Institute, (2007), p. 34.
21 S.D. Muni, ‘India and the Post-Cold War World: Opportunities and Challenges’, Asian Survey, (1991), 31 (9), p. 869.
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2. Today: India’s foreign policy choices aft er the Cold War
Th e end of the US- Soviet Union confrontation and India’s fi nancial crisis in the beginning of 1990s entailed the change of 
direction in state’s foreign policy, focusing on economic reforms and redefi ning relations with other states. India acknowledged 
the importance of economic growth as a factor in domestic poverty alleviation and for the realization of national interests 
in the international arena22. As the Cold War ended, the relationship based on “anti-imperialist, anti-colonial and anti-
racist” principles needed to be renewed, where new relationships were established and developed through economy and 
commerce23. Th is principle has remained integral for establishing relations with actors who help to serve India’s foreign 
policy interests or pose some kind of foreign policy challenges to India. In other words, focusing on economic aspects enable 
actors with diff erent interests to cooperate.
Th erefore, India’s 21st century’s strategic partnerships with two of the biggest economies, USA and EU rely heavily on trade 
and technology cooperation. In addition, the partnership with USA has touched the boundaries of strategical issues like 
cooperation on counter-terrorism, defence trade, joint military exercises, civil nuclear cooperation and energy dialogue24. 
Although not as successfully as the other side would hope. Th e aspirations towards more politically strategic partnership 
have been also one of the priorities in relations with EU. Again, the established relations rely on pragmatic considerations 
on the contrary to India’s moral principles and solidarity towards Th ird World that is still dominant, when discussions about 
possible allies arise. Even more, India’s dissatisfaction with the dominant world order is also distinguishable in its bargaining 
strategies25. However, the focus on economy and commerce still enables India to build up relations with desired partners.
Another distinctive feature of India’s foreign policy aft er the end of the Cold War has been the aim to adjust international 
institutions consistent with changes in international system. Th e support for strengthening and reforming the UN as a 
multilateral forum, restructuring the international economic system and preserving independence in its decision-making 
has become an integral part of India’s foreign policy26. Furthermore, the dissatisfaction with the world order- today hegemony 
and unipolarity is still present:
“Th e demise of one of the blocks has not done away with the pressing problems of the world. On 
the contrary, renewed strategic interests bent on domination grow stronger and, even, acquire new 
and more dangerous dimensions for underdeveloped countries.”27
2.1 Strengthening the region: Looking and Acting East
India’s policy in Asia has been shaped by events in world politics. Asian countries were amongst India’s foreign policy 
priorities already in 1950s, but the challenges during the Cold War kept country occupied with rather reacting to changes 
than implementing a preferred policy. Th e 1990s on the contrary, on one hand enabled and on the other hand induced 
the country to focus on strengthening relations with neighbouring countries. New focus on the region was derived from 
the economic reforms and ‘Look East Policy’ (now known as ‘Act East Policy’), when country was in need for new trade 
22 Mansingh.
23 Muchkund Dubey, India’s Foreign Policy: Coping with the Changing World, New Delhi: Pearson, (2013), p. 24.
24 Government of India Ministry of External Aff airs, Annual Report 2012-2013; Government of India Ministry of External Aff airs, 
Annual Report 2013-2014, New Delhi, (2014), available online at: <http://www.mea.gov.in/annual-reports.htm?57/Annual_Reports> 
(accessed 12.06.2018).
25 Narlikar, ‘India Rising: Responsible to Whom?’
26 Government of India Ministry of External Aff airs, Annual Report 2013-2014.
27 Ministry of External Aff airs, 2012b, ch. Evolution
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partners. Even more, the collapse of the Soviet Union as India’s close trade partner both in military and consumer goods and 
a supporter of India’s diplomacy in UN, was one catalyst for searching new policy options28.
Hence, India in 1990s was not only interested in new trade partners, but was also committed to build up its vision of integrated 
region as a response to changing international order. Next to the new strategy built upon economic considerations stood 
also the combination of changes in world arena- globalization and the success of regional integrations like ASEAN, EU, 
NAFTA, APEC. Focusing on improving relations with neighbours was also a mean for tackling the possible problems posed 
by the new world order. Th e recent history had provided India numerous valuable experiences. In addition, the tendency 
for regional integrations aft er Cold War prompted India to undertake changes in foreign policy means to achieve its goals of 
foreign policy independence. By building up closer relations with regional associations, India prevented the risk of being left  
into isolation. India thus decided to direct its policy towards South and South East Asia29.
Th e reasons behind India’s decision to focus on the region are multidimensional embodying domestic, regional and international 
factors. In addition to the desire to avoid extensive impacts from possible great power rivalries, India’s determination for 
integrated, peaceful and stable region has been infl uenced by considerations for country’s economic development and social 
harmony30. Good relations with neighbouring countries serve the purpose of economic growth providing a precondition for 
economic sustainability to decrease dependency and vulnerability from major powers.
One of the cornerstones for India’s ‘Act East Policy’ has been participation in ASEAN. PM Modi has attached substantial 
importance to ASEAN, when addressing the association as “… an example and inspiration” for acting in “… a world 
that summons us to rise above divisions and competition to work together.”31 ASEAN and India share a vision of more 
integrated and peaceful region, and the relationship serves either side’s goals to increase economic growth. In addition, 
it also contributes to India’s aims of closer relations with other states and ventures in the region. Th e close relationship 
and economic integration with ASEAN has facilitated India’s engagement with East Asia Summit (EAS), the Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM) and bilateral relations with ASEAN countries. Th e emphasis on ASEAN has been a strategically important 
step to improve close relationships with other regional groupings and countries, and thereby to pave the way for the role of 
a stronger regional actor.
Indo-Pacifi c has obtained remarkable attention by India. Th e importance to India was especially emphasized lately in PM 
Modi’s speech at Shangri La Dialogue when he rejected the possible view of a region “… as a strategy or as a club of limited 
members.”32 Even more, PM Modi underlined that “India’s own engagement in the Indo-Pacifi c Region – from the shores 
of Africa to that of the Americas - will be inclusive.”33 Pacifi c has become a new centre for world trade attracting India to 
pay more attention to the region. As an example of the importance India has attached to the region, India has more trade 
agreements in the region than in any part of the world.34
2.2 Working towards just international system: Empowering emerging powers
Another mean to execute India’s foreign policy strategy of autonomy has been forming extensive partnerships with other 
emerging powers. As a result, there is an overlap of countries in diff erent platforms, as can be seen in cases of India’s partnership 
28 Th ongkholal Haokip, ‘India’s Look East Policy: Its Evolution and Approach’, South Asian Survey, (2011), 18 (2), p. 245.
29 Th ongkholal Haokip, ‘Recent Trends in Regional Integration and the Indian Experience’, International Area Studies Review, (2012), 
15 (4), pp. 377–92.
30 Government of India Ministry of External Aff airs, Annual Report 2012-2013.
31 Modi, ‘Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue (June 01, 2018)’.
32 Modi, ‘Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue (June 01, 2018)’.
33 Modi, ‘Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue (June 01, 2018)’.
34 Modi, ‘Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue (June 01, 2018)’.
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with BRICS and IBSA. Although the established forms of cooperation might not have gained their full operational impact, 
they serve as a good platform for forming common positions and necessary alliances for specifi c situations or events35.
IBSA, where the participant countries overlap with BRICS members is not as outstanding in international arena as BRICS, 
but enables for India to use it as a forum for discussing and establishing common positions on mutually important matters. 
With the purpose of raising developing countries’ voice in international system, it is argued to be a new representative of 
Non-Alignment36. Institutions’ ground principles of changing and reforming Western dominated institutions have given 
India friends in one of the driving principles of its foreign policy. In fact, when establishing IBSA Dialogue Forum, three 
countries prioritized the Charter of the UN and discussed reforming UN Security Council37. India, Brazil and South Africa 
aim for reforms in the UN to strengthen the role of the developing countries in the international system- an aim that was 
also one of the driving forces of NAM. Th ree middle-powers have been actively negotiating the conditions benefi cial for 
developing countries in international institutions. Next to India and Brazil’s cooperation for the reform of UN Security 
Reform is the common stand for conditions that would take into account developing countries advantages in WTO38. It has 
been even argued that IBSA has an implication for soft  balancing through their cooperation in international organizations 
by aiming “to transform the global order in favour of emerging powers in the medium-term”39. Although the cooperation 
between IBSA countries is very much value-based, the pragmatic considerations for the expansion of trade should not be 
excluded.
Although BRICS’ public profi le has focused on empowering developing countries’ economies, it serves for India twofold 
purpose: raising the voices and profi les of emerging markets and powers, and working towards more just international 
system, where the Western dominated institutions have alternatives or complementary opportunities. BRICS speaks with 
its economic, demographical and geographical power. According to statistics published in 2017, BRICS represents around 
41% of world population and 29% of land mass40. Together they combine a considerable amount and a variety of world 
resources and in international trade.41 In 2016, BRICS share of world export accounted for 18.2% and share of world import 
35 Sanjukta Banerji Bhattacharya, ‘Engaging Africa: India’s Interests in the African Continent, Past and Present’, in Th e Rise of China & 
India in Africa: Challenges, Opportunities and Critical Interventions, ed. by Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi, London: Zed Books, (2010), 
pp. 71–72.
36 Abdul Nafey, ‘IBSA Forum: Th e Rise of “New” Non-Alignment’, India Quarterly: A Journal of International Aff airs, (2005), 61, 
pp. 1–78.
37 India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum, ‘1st IBSA Summit Meeting’, Joint Declaration, (2006), par. 8, par. 10, available online at: 
<http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/images/stories/documents/declarations/1st_summit_declaration.pdf> (accessed 22.06.2018).
38 Daniel Flemes, ‘India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) in the New Global Order: Interests, Strategies and Values of the Emerging 
Coalition’, International Studies, (2009), 46 (4), pp. 404–5.
39 Flemes.
40 BRICS, ‘General Information, Economic and Social Indicators Comparison of BRICS Countries’, BRICS Joint Statistical Publication 
2017, (2017), p. 19, available online at: <http://www.brics2018.org.za/sites/default/fi les/documents/Statistics/BRICS Joint_Statistics 
Publication 2017.pdf> (accessed 23 June 2018).
41 Brazil exports 44.2% of world’s soy beans, 41.3% of world’s raw sugar, making it the biggest exporter for both products in the world 
and 20.2% of world’s iron ore (2nd biggest exporter in world aft er Australia). Russia exports 11.1% of world’s crude petroleum (2nd 
aft er Saudi Arabia), 9.3% of refi ned petroleum (2nd aft er USA) and nearly 12.2% of coal (3rd aft er Australia and Indonesia). India 
exports 15.3% of world’s diamonds (2nd aft er USA) and nearly 10.6% of world’s jewellery (4th aft er Switzerland, China and USA). 
China is the largest exporter in world, exporting 41.2% of world’s automatic data processing machines and its units, 23.6% of world’s 
electrical machinery and its parts and 36.1% of world’s telephones ’s, making it the largest exporter in world in all previous product 
categories. South Africa exports 24.5% of world’s platinum, making it the biggest platinum exporter in the world, 5% of world’s iron 
ore (3rd in world aft er Australia and Brazil). Th e data is based on year 2017 exports World Trade Organization, ‘Statistics Database’, 
(2018), available online at: <http://stat.wto.org/Home/WSDBHome.aspx?Language=E> (accessed 24 June 2018); Trade Map, 
‘Exports’, (2018), available online at: <https://www.trademap.org/> (accessed 24 June 2018).
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for 14.6%42, compared to 5.4% and 4.8% respectively in 199243.44 Th e emerging powers are aware of their importance and 
weight in the world economy. As a consequence of BRICS growing economic weight, the entity has taken a common position 
that existing international institutions and organizations need to be changed, where the current economical weight of the 
BRICS countries, other emerging economies and developing countries will be taken into account. Th e dissatisfaction with 
the standstill of the IMF and UN Security Council reforms has lead the rising economies to search for alternative solutions 
to show and execute their infl uence in world aff airs. Th e signing of agreement establishing New Development Bank (NDB) 
dealing with infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other developing countries is the beginning 
of their initiative.
At the same time when signing the NDB agreement, the treaty establishing BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement 
(CRA) was signed, which is another step closer supplementing USA dominated fi nancial system. Th e two new institutions 
complement for Th ird World countries World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF), which are dominated 
by Western powers. Although the new institutions cannot yet compete with WB and IMF, in case they should become fully 
operational, it serves as an alternative to current conditions-based institutions. If developing countries will be using DNB 
instead of WB, the BRICS will be dominating and infl uencing the respective countries and balancing other major powers in 
the international system.
Yet, notwithstanding the similarities between BRICS and IBSA, there are substantial diff erences in their essence that also 
refl ect India’s aims in these ventures. IBSA was founded on the initiatives of three respective countries to enhance South-
South cooperation between three continents. One of the founding objectives was to reform the international system in a way 
that would take into account the voice of developing countries. BRICS on the other hand was fi rst used as an acronym for 
fast growing economies; the actions were institutionalized fi ve years aft er the term was taken into use based largely on future 
prospects. Another factor of diff erence points to IBSA as representing the democratic states of BRICS as well as the matter of 
standing closer to Western values than Russia and China.
Th e purpose of the two for India is similar- to increase the participation and share of developing countries in international 
policy-making. Although BRICS is more visible in international arena and has taken ambitious objectives on examples of 
NDB and CRA, it is and will be most likely dominated by China. BRICS includes China as India’s neighbour and long-term 
source for disagreements in regional and world matters, e.g. China’s reluctance to India being permanent member of UN 
Security Council. In IBSA, on the contrary, India is equal with other members, furthermore, IBSA’s members are directly or 
indirectly related to NAM and thus share the same values.
2.3 Reforming the unfunctional structures: Attracting the W(r)est
India has been an active G445 country speaking for the reform of the UN Security Council and having been elected seven 
times as a non-permanent member46. It has also announced its ambition to become a non-permanent member of the Council 
42 World Trade Organization, ‘Statistics Database’, Statistics, (2017), available online at: 
<http://stat.wto.org/Home/WSDBHome.aspx?Language=E> (accessed 24 June 2018).
43 World Trade Organization, ‘International Trade and Market Access Data’, Statistics, (2018), available online at: 
<https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/statis_bis_e.htm?solution=WTO&path=/Dashboards/MAPS&fi le=Map.wcdf&bookmar
kState=%7B%22impl%22:%22client%22,%22params%22:%7B%22langParam%22:%22en%22%7D%7D> (accessed 24 June 2018).
44 Author’s compilation based on WTO database. 1992 data by WTO excludes India’s exports and imports in military goods, fi ssionable 
materials and bunkers.
45 G4 comprises of Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, who all aspire to become permanent members at UN Security Council and 
support each other’s demands in it.
46 United Nations Security Council, ‘Countries Elected Members of the Security Council’, (2018), available online at: 
<http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/elected.asp> (accessed 20.06.2018).
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during the period of 2021-202247. Th ese eff orts have played an integral role in performing its vision of becoming a great 
power, where one precondition for achieving such purpose is making itself visible among international actors.
India has been consistent in reinforcing the foundations of its visibility in a world arena and also in relations with great 
powers. One of the most outstanding declarations was in 2014 when PM Modi made a statement at UN General Assembly 
and declared the need for the reform of UN to refl ect 21st century international system48. Although the declaration itself was 
nothing new, PM Modi’s speech about the need for changes refl ected more than just a desire to reform UN. It spoke about 
mutual responsibilities of international actors, where the poverty eradication, fi ght against terrorism and tackling other 
global challenges is the responsibility of all49. Th us, reforming the UN extends further from India’s aspirations to change the 
international institution merely according to its own interests. Namely, India views the UN as a multilateral forum who has 
the chances, but even more importantly, the responsibility for collective action, dialogue and engagement for the purpose 
of peace, equality and development. Changed UN thus serves twofold purpose for India: on one hand, it enables to pursue 
its own interest, but on the other hand, with rights and opportunities come responsibilities to all actors participating in 
international system. PM Modi’s speech thus is an example illustrating the driving principles of India’s foreign policy that 
stands also for the solidarity of and for all.
Next to India’s ambitions of reforming the international structures, equal attention has been paid to domestic reforms. Modi 
has undertaken substantial reforms on India’s bureaucratic machine with the aim to raise India’s ranking in World Bank’s 
‘the ease of making business’ index from 134th to 50th50.51 Other aspects of reforms lie in raising population out of poverty 
and improving country’s poor infrastructure52. Th e purpose of the reforms is threefold: to attract foreign direct investments 
for continuous economic growth, develop relations with other actors, and to raise its international economic profi le. India’s 
economic reforms are amongst other purposes as a prerequisite for being noticed in the world and to expand country’s 
global role53. Th e rise of its economic profi le is expected to give India economic power, which in turn is another factor 
enabling country to raise its infl uence in world aff airs54. India’s aims for wealth combined with BJP and Hindu nationalist’s 
goals of leading the country to the great power status adds thus a geo-economic dimension to India’s foreign policy, where 
wealth accumulation is expected to pursue state’s political objectives55. India aspires towards economic strengthening of the 
47 Permanent Mission of India to the UN, ‘Security Council’, India and UN, (2018), available online at: <https://www.pminewyork.org/
pages?id=eyJpdiI6InV4bXg3M0N2TUdSVlA1bEp4cDlvS3c9PSIsInZhbHVlIjoiR3pyOTBsRDNkXC9zQTlEU0x5Mnl1bGc9PSIsIm1
hYyI6IjE2NTBjZTRiNDkyMzhlNTA0ZjkwMjY2Y2NhZTh lNDIxM2E2MTI2YTY2ZTk2ODYwYjMyMDA2NmJmYmFlMjQ1ZDQif
Q==&subid=eyJpdiI6IjJFV21yWW9E> (accessed 22 June 2018).
48 Narendra Modi, Statement by H.E. Narendra Modi, General Debate of the 69th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New 
York, 27 September 2014, available online at: <http://www.un.org/en/ga/69/meetings/gadebate/pdf/IN_en.pdf> 
(accessed 22.06.2018).
49 Modi, Statement by H.E. Narendra Modi.
50 Th e Economist, ‘Remaking India: Yes, Prime Minister’, Th e Economist, DELHI, 18 October 2014, available online at: 
<http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21625857-more-moderniser-market-reformer-narendra-modi-relies-his-bureaucrats-yes-
prime-minister> (accessed 21.06.2018).
51 Although there have been improvements in India’s rise in the ranking, the ambition of being among top 50 has not yet been met. 
In 2018, World Bank placed India on 100th place Th e World Bank, ‘India Jumps Doing Business Rankings with Sustained Reform 
Focus’, Press Release, (2017), available online at: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/10/31/india-jumps-doing-
business-rankings-with-sustained-reform-focus> (accessed 24 June 2018).
52 Th e Economist, ‘Reviving India’s Economy: Modi’s Mission’, Th e Economist, Mumbai, 24 May 2014, available online at: 
<http://www.economist.com/news/briefi ng/21602709-new-prime-minister-has-good-chance-resuscitating-countrys-underperform-
ing> (accessed 14 October 2014).
53 Niranjan Sahoo, ‘Decoding Modi’s Foreign Policy’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 23 September 2014, available online 
at: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/09/23/decoding-modi-s-foreign-policy> (accessed 14 October 2014).
54 Samuel P Huntington, ‘Why International Primacy Matters’, International Security, (1993), 17 (4), p. 72.
55 Deborah Cowen and Neil Smith, ‘Aft er Geopolitics? From the Geopolitical Social to Geoeconomics’, Antipode, (2009), 41 (1), p. 42.
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country to maintain the competitiveness in the international arena both in economic and political terms56. According to 
geo-economists, economic power is the new strategy to gain primacy, “a state with primacy can establish, or at least strongly 
infl uence, ‘the rules of the game’ by which international politics is played…”57
3. Strategic autonomy explained
Strategic autonomy as a term is not new in debates about India’s foreign policy. Th e term has been used mainly to explain 
India’s foreign policy in relations with USA58, but also to provide Indian foreign policy decision makers support and guidance 
in a changing international system59. Th e concept has been very well adopted in explaining India’s foreign policy ambitions by 
referring to foreign policy independence. Nonetheless, there is more about strategic autonomy than making and maintaining 
its independence in foreign policy.
Strategic autonomy for India on one hand is the de facto freedom to make its own choices and actions, but on the other hand 
is meant to serve also other third world countries’ interests on international arena. In other words, India’s understanding of 
strategic autonomy entails next to India’s own interests also aim of bringing other less heard countries’ voices to international 
arena. Even more, it’s about justice in terms of creating the international system where all states’ voices will be heard and 
decisions are made on value-based consensus. Such idea is oft en misunderstood and confused with ‘opposing some states 
and allying the others.’ India’s relations, or even expectations to states do not depend merely on what kind of benefi ts they 
bring to India. On the contrary, for India, the power of established powers means responsibilities in international arena next 
to pursuing merely one’s own interests60. Strategic autonomy for India is both about power-politics and responsibilities.
Although the idea of idealistic and moralistic principles in India’s strategic autonomy has developed from Nehruvian 
non-alignment principles, PM Modi’s view of India’s role in international system has added the economic and traditional 
power aspects to policy implementation61. Strategic autonomy is a substantial part of India’s grand strategy of great power 
status, where the responsibilities and autonomy work together. Th e building up of close relations with its neighborhood 
and other emerging powers, and domestic and international reforms is thus twofold. Firstly, Cold War- time experiences 
taught India a valuable lesson of misconceptions between established powers and developing ones in terms of expectations 
and understandings. Th e post- Cold War period has in some way continued it, as India’s course is still oft en questioned by 
established powers. Th e latter is even intensifi ed in the context of India as a rising power. India, thus, emphasizes the relations 
with region and emerging powers not only in terms of economic development, but also as actors with similar understandings 
and expectations of the world system. In some way, the relations can be described as expectations without expectations. 
States interact with each other in expectations to change the international system, but without expectations to ‘ally or oppose.’ 
Secondly, building up on all above, India’s idea of strategic autonomy is very well aware of the interdependent world, where 
56 Sanjaya Baru, ‘Geo-Economics and Strategy’, Survival, (2012), 54 (3), pp. 47–58; Vincent Cable, ‘What Is International Economic 
Security?’, International Aff airs (Royal Institute of International Aff airs 1944-), (1995), 71 (2), pp. 305–24; Huntington; Edward N 
Luttwak, ‘From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics: Logic of Confl ict, Grammar of Commerce’, in Th e Geopolitics Reader, ed. by Gearó id 
Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby, and Paul Routledge, Taylor & F, London: Routledge, 1998, pp. 125–30.
57 Robert Jervis, ‘International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?’, International Security, (1993), 17 (4), 52–67, p. 53).
58 Guillem Monsonis, ‘India’s Strategic Autonomy and Rapprochement with the US’, Strategic Analysis, (2010), 34 (4), pp. 611–24; 
C. Raja Mohan, ‘“India: Between ‘Strategic Autonomy’ and ‘Geopolitical Opportunity’.”’, Asia Policy, (2013), 15, pp. 21–25; Howard 
B. Schaff er Teresita C. Schaff er, India at the Global Hightable: Th e Quest for Regional Primacy and Strategic Autonomy, Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2016; Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, ‘India’s Strategic Autonomy Dilemma and the 
Rapprochement with the United States’, New Delhi, 2009, available online at: 
<https://idsa.in/event/IndiavsUS_gmonsonis_200309> (accessed 22.06.2018).
59 Sunil Khilnani and others, Nonalignment 2.0 A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century, New Delhi, India, 
2012, available online at: <http://www.cprindia.org/sites/default/fi les/NonAlignment 2.0_1.pdf> (accessed 23.06.2018).
60 Narlikar, ‘India Rising: Responsible to Whom?’
61 e.g. see Narlikar 2017
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decisions need to be made in a context of ‘liking to some and not liking to others.’ Why then not to make value-based 
decisions and maintain its coherent foreign policy.
4. Conclusion
Th e confrontation between two superpowers ended almost two decades ago, but NAM principles have remained an integral 
part of India’s foreign policy. Although there is a diff erence in the focus of research, a similar conclusion was made by Pant 
and Super62 when studying India’s grand strategy in 21st century challenges.
Dissatisfaction with the existing world order, whether it to be bipolar or unipolar combined with the support for the same 
principles as during Cold War is one of the driving forces of the foreign policy. Th e end of the confrontation changed 
international system primarily for the Western world, but did not bring any major developments to Th ird World, including 
India63. Memberships in decisive bodies of international institutions remained unchanged refl ecting Cold War time 
international order. Despite some substantial reforms in India (and in wider Asia), economic and technical fl ourishing took 
place mainly in North America and Europe. Th e continuing dominance of post- Second War world order in international 
institutions and economic developments has kept developing countries’ place in the architecture of international system 
the same as during Cold War. India with other developing countries in today’s international arena stands on behalf of the 
common interests for the equality of voices in international arena.
As a result, India has built up the relationships on common interests that in many ways are based on shared understandings of 
the world order, whether it to be in international system or in parts of the international system. Th is shared understanding of the 
world order speaks on behalf of the changes, which should incorporate an arrangement considering the voice of the developing 
world and emerging powers. India has skilfully chosen the strategy and principles upon which to build the partnerships that 
serve the purpose of changing the dominant world order where the voice of Th ird World, including India, will be heard.
In pursuing its foreign policy objectives and choosing the rightful strategy, India has through time focused on adapting 
to either on-going or future changes in the world arena. End of the Cold War enabled to focus on achieving long wanted 
regional integration, but the endeavours were equally derived and amplifi ed by the desire to remain active player in the new 
world order. Focusing on the region was fi rst step to conform to the world in its immediate neighbourhood. Being a skilled 
player in achieving its medium-term foreign policy aims and taking into account the historical relationships, the economic 
cooperation served India’s and its partners’ interests in economic growth and shared vision of more integrated region.
Today, the means for continuing NAM policy have changed accordingly to the world order, but principles remain largely 
the same. Nehru’s foreign policy principles and vision of a ‘just’ world order have been dominating in India’s post-Cold War 
world aff airs with PM Modi’s realistic foreign policy goals. Foreign policy ambitions of becoming a great power combined 
with dissatisfaction about the governing international institutions; and the focus of its foreign policy towards like-minded 
countries to work for the equitable, multi-polar world order, have directed India’s actions against the current systemic 
concentration of power.
Strategic autonomy as a strategy and a purpose exhibits a major diff erence between India’s and Western foreign policy 
thinking. For India, idealistic and moralistic principles enable simultaneously foreign policy with realistic aims, challenging 
Western dualistic and binary foreign policy thinking. Th e combination of somewhat contradictory principles enables to 
work with like-minded countries towards mutual interests, while also develop relations with other competing actors and 
great powers. Th e success of Indian policy is thus very much dependent on international actors’ willingness to accept and 
understand the reality of post-Western world.
62 Harsh V Pant and Julie M Super, ‘India ’ s “ Non-Alignment ” Conundrum : A Twentieth-Century Policy in a Changing World’, 
International Aff airs, (2015), 91 (4), pp. 747–64.
63 Muni, p. 864.
